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COMMENTS
antitrust cases which will be coming before the courts in the future,
the establishment of an administrative agency to enforce these laws
might well provide a better means of enforcement than the courts.
Such a board would be better equipped to gather and analyze economic
data, would eventually develop economic and legal experts familiar
with the problems arising out of antitrust prosecutions, and what is
more important, would develop a uniform policy in the enforcement of
the antitrust laws3 4
CRIMINAL LAw-POWER OF A TRIAL COURT TO MODIFY A VERDICT
State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956)
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
He moved for a new trial, and after a hearing on the motion, the trial
judge found that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict
and entered judgment modifying the degree of the offense to murder
in the second degree. On certiorari" the appellate court reversed and
directed a new trial holding that where the evidence does not support
the verdict the limit of the trial judge's authority, and his duty, is to
order a new trial.2
'4. See 118 F. Supp. at 213 where Judge Leahy states that there is much
ai gument as to the interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust laws and that
"excellence of corporate function . . . calls for a critical re-examination by the
Congress, after a half-a-century of the enforcement of the Sherman and allied
Acts."
For judicial suggestions that courts and judges may not be capable of handling
masses of economic data, see Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
:3 to n.1:3 (1948) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345
n.2 (D. Mass. 1952). In the principal case, the success of the defense may be at-
tributed to the tremendous amount of evidence which defendant produced in prov-
nig the existence of competition, an approach which corporations in the future
might very well take to heart. For a summary of the extent of defendant's evi-
dence, see 118 F. Supp. at 198. The government, on the other hand, failed to offer
any guides for determining degree of market control. Id. at 196.
It has been suggested that a panel of economic experts be provided for the
judge. Clark, The Orientation of Antitrust Policy, 40 Ai. ECON. REv. 93, 98
(1910); Newnan, The Place of Economic and Market Analysis in Antitrust Ad-
ministration, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 743, 752 (1956). In United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., supra, an economist, disguised as a law clerk, served as economic
adlvisor to Judge Wyzanski. Newman, supra at 746.
See also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 25 U.S.L. WEEx 1117 (8th Cir.
Jan. 23}, 1957) (Citing the principal case, defendant argued for a broad inter-
pretation of the relevant market. The court, however, concluded that broadcasting
stations, newsreels, topical books, and other specialty items were not competing,
in the t ue sense of the word, with defendant newspaper.).
1. The defendant sought dismissal of the state's petition on the ground that the
state was precluded from an appeal in a criminal case. The court, citing TENN.
Cor)E ANN. §§ 40-3401, 40-3404 (1955), held that the state was precluded from
appeal in Tennessee only when the trial had resulted in an acquittal. State v.
Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tenn. 1956).
For a general discussion of the right of a state to appeal in criminal cases, see
Miller, Appeals by tMe State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486 (1927); Note,
47 YALn L.J. 489 (1938); Comment, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 439 (1938).
2. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
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Generally, the trial court has the duty to rule on the legal sufficiency
of the evidence presented at the trial.3- At any time after the state"
has presented its evidence and prior to submission of the case to the
jury a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is proper.4 The court,
acting either on its own motion or on a motion of the defendant, should
direct a verdict of acquittal if the state has failed to present sufficient
evidence to warrant a conviction.5 Failure to direct a verdict when
acting on the defendant's motion will be reversible error on appeal if
there is insufficient evidence to support any conviction.6 If, however,
the state has presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction of
any lesser included offense, the trial court should not direct a verdict
but should instruct the jury as to any degree of the crime of which
substantial evidence was presented.7 Should an erroneous instruction
result in a conviction of the defendant for an offense of which there
is no substantial evidence, on appeal the conviction will be modified to
conform to the evidence8 or will be reversed and remanded., On the
other hand, if there is sufficient evidence of any crime to submit to the
jury and the trial court nevertheless directs a verdict of acquittal, the
3. Questions of law are for the determination of the court and questions of fact
are for the determination of the jury. Accordingly, it is for the court to determine
if the state has presented evidence of facts sufficient to warrant a conviction. See
State v. King, 66 Ariz. 42, 182 P.2d 915 (1947); State v. Schneiderman, 20 N.J.
422, 120 A.2d 89 (1956). See also ALI CODE OF CRIM. P. § 323, commentary at 962
(1930), listing the various types of statutes which prescribe the function of the
trial court and the jury. But see Posey v. State, 131 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ind. 1956),
citing IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19, for the proposition that the jury determines ques-
tions of law as well as questions of fact.
4. ALl CODE OF CRM. P. § 321, commentary at 960 (1930) ; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 435 (1947).
5. See France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676, 681 (1897); ALI CODE OF CaiM.
P. § 321, commentary at 960 (1930); ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 435. How-
ever, all jurisdictions do not make the direction of a verdict the duty of the trial
court. See State v. Thierfelder, 114 Mont. 104, 115-16, 132 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1943),
where the court, relying on a state statute, held that the judge should only advise
and not direct a verdict of acquittal. Cf. Posey v. State, 131 N.E.2d 145 (Ind.
1956), to the effect that the jury and not the judge determines questions of law.
For an extensive annotation on the power of the trial judge to direct a verdict,
see Annot., 17 A.L.R. 910 (1922).
6. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 33 Ky. 141, 109 S.W. 353 (1908). See also
France v. United States, 164 U.S. 676 (1897).
Since the judgment non obstante verdicto is not generally recognized in criminal
procedure (ORFELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 436-37), the trial court is without
authority to correct its own' errors in ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evidence
in the absence of statute (see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 871 (Supp. 1955) for an
example of statutory authorization), but the power has been assumed by the
appellate courts. France v. United States, supra; State v. Young, 237 Mo. 170,
140 S.W. 873 (1911).
7. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 33 Ky. 141, 109 S.W. 353 (1908); 4 WARREN,
HOMICIDE § 344 (1938).
The jury is bound to return a verdict which corresponds to the instructions
given them, and the trial court may refuse to accept a verdict which does not so
conform. See State v. Miles, 199 Mo. 530, 98 S.W. 25 (1906); State v. Godwin,
138 N.C. 582, 50 S.E. 277 (1905); cf. Commonwealth v. Clifford, 254 Mass. 390,
150 N.E. 181 (1926).
8. Strawn v. State, 202 Ark. 744, 151 S.W.2d 988 (1941).
9. State v. Young, 237 Mo. 170, 140 S.W. 873 (1911).
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error generally will not be reviewable, for in most jurisdictions the
state may not appeal from an acquittal. 10 In essence, therefore, prior
to submission of the case to the jury the trial judge is given broad
powers of control over the degree of the offense for which the defend-
ant may be convicted.
A modern development in criminal procedure is the use of the de-
ferred motion for judgment of acquittal." Under this procedure the
trial court, at its discretion, may reserve ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict until after the close of the trial, thereby postponing
any ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evidence until such time as a
judicious review of the record has been made. By so doing the possi-
bility of prejudicial error which might result from a hasty ruling is
minimized while at the same time prospect of a speedy culmination
of the trial is enhanced."
The majority of jurisdictions, however, fail to recognize the use of
deferred motions for judgment of acquittal. The power of the trial
court in these jurisdictions to entertain motions after rendition of the
verdict is normally limited by statute. These post-trial motions may
be classified generally as motions in arrest of judgment1' and motions
for a new trial.'4
At common law the use of motions in arrest of judgment was re-
stricted to the situation where a demurrer would have been the proper
method of attack prior to judgment,"5 i.e., they would properly lie
for matters apparent on the face of the record, but would not lie for
purposes of reviewing the evidence. 6 Where statutorily altered in
this country specific provisions define the grounds for which a motion
1). ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEkLS IN AMERICA 69-72 (1939). But see State v.
Thierfelder, 114 Mont. 104, 132 P.2d 1035 (1943), which allowed the state to
appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal.
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(b). This power of the trial judge was recognized with-
out statute in the federal jurisdiction as early as 1938. United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Wis. 1938), 87 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1939), aff'd
Sub nor. Ex parte United States, 101 F.2d 870 (7th Cir.), aff'd by equally divided
Court sub norn. United States v. Stone, 308 U.S. 519 (1939) (mandamus to lower
court to set aside order dismissing the indictment).
12. See Orfield, Jvdment Notwithstandbig the Verdict in Federal Criminal
Cae,, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 107 (1955); 52 HARv. L. REV. 1358 (1939); 25
VA. L. REV. 987 (1939); 49 YALE L.J. 733 (1940).
1:3. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 788.1 (1950); 01O REV. CODE ANN. § 2947.02(Baldwin 1953). See also ORFIELD, op. cit. supra, note 4, c. 8.
14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 278, § 29 (1956); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 547.020-.040 (1949). See also ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 8.
15. At common law ... any objection which would have been fatal in de-
murrer was ... equally fatal on . . . arrest of judgment. Judgment, how-
ever, can only be arrested for matter appearing on the record . . . not
confined to the indictment alone, as it obtains if any part of the record is
imperfect, repugnant or vicious.
:3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1692, at 2127-28 (10th ed. 1918). See also
CIXL. PEN. CODE § 1185 (Supp. 1935).
16. Ibid.
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in arrest of judgment may be made.17 In the absence of statutory au-
thority, they do not lie for the purpose of reviewing the evidence. 8
Therefore, unless the statute specifically provides, the trial court may
not rule upon the sufficiency of the evidence when hearing a motion in
arrest of judgment.
The purpose of the motion for a new trial is to provide an opportu-
nity after verdict for the trial court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence, to review the proceedings for error, and in the light of new
evidence, or, if overruled, to lay a foundation for an appeal."0 State
statutes specify whether the motion must rest on specific grounds,20 or
may lie "when it shall appear to the court that justice has not been
done...."2 1 In the majority of states a sustained motion for a new
trial sets aside the verdict and provides for a re-examination of the
issue by the court and another jury.22 Some states make exceptions
to this rule and provide in their "new trial" statute for modification
of the judgment by the trial court when ruling upon a motion for a
new trial.23 Such an exception is commensurate to the lower court's
action in the principal case which, however, was decided in a state
without a modification statute.24
The few cases which have considered the problem of the trial judge's
power to modify a verdict are not in harmony.25 Jurisdictions holding
that the power exists in the trial judge do so on the theory that a
verdict of guilty of the greater offense necessarily includes a conviction
17. See IowA CODE ANN. § 788.1 (1950), 14 IoWA L. REv. 499 (1929); Onio
REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.02 (Baldwin 1953).
18. A recent Missouri case has pointed this up vividly. In State v. Pottinger,
287 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1956), the court, acting on its own motion, set aside the
verdict on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, thereby acquitting the de-
fendant. The state was not allowed to appeal from the acquittal. However, the
Supreme Court of Missouri in dicta pointed out that if it had had to decide the
point of the acquittal on the grounds stated, it would have ruled the trial court's
action in setting aside the verdict error, on the basis that the only grounds for
arrest of judgment in Missouri are clearly set out in Mo. SuP. CT. RuLE 27.22,
and insufficiency of evidence is not an allowable ground. See also State v. Fer-
guson, 165 Tenn. 61, 52 S.W.2d 140 (1932) ; Berger v. State, 179 Md. 410, 20 A.2d
146 (1941).
In Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 24 A.2d 460 (1942), it was held
that the state statute did not allow arrest of judgment for insufficiency of evi-
dence. Pennsylvania statutes have since been altered to allow arrest of judgment
on this ground. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 871 (Supp. 1956).
19. ORFELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 498.
20. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 787.3 (1950); Mo. RaV. STAT. § 547.020 (1949).
21. FED. R. CRIAr. P. 33; MASs. ANN. LAws c. 278, § 29 (Supp. 1954); Micn.
STAT. ANN. § 28.1098 (1954).
22. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.010 (1949); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
751 (1950).
23. CAL. PENN. CODE § 1181 (1949); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 920.06 (1947); Omo
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2945.79 (Baldwin 1953).
24. State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956).
25. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 214 n.2 (1953); 15 CAL.
L. REv. 531 (1927).
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of all the lesser included offenses.2-G Thus, in ruling on the sufficiency
of the evidence the trial judge may find that the evidence fails to sus-
tain the conviction of the greater offense, but is sufficient to support a
conviction of a lesser crime. Since the jury necessarily found the
elements of the lesser crime present by their finding that the elements
of the greater offense were present, the modification is not thought to
be an encroachment on the province of the jury in determining the
facts. This view gives the trial judge power after verdict analogous
to that which he exercises in ruling on the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence prior to submission of the case to the jury.27 On the other hand,
the cases in agreement with the principal case have denied the trial
court this power by holding such to be an encroachment on the right
of the jury to determine the degree of the crime committed.28 It should
be noted, however, that the trial judge and not the jury is to determine
the sufficiency of the evidence.
The lack of appellate rulings on this point could stem from prose-
cutors' distaste for further trial after a conviction has been obtained,
albeit lesser in degree, or from a failure of the trial judge to recognize
such a power. Whatever the reason may be, the vast number of new
trials granted hints to the need for reform in this area.2 9 It is evident
that generally the present practice is to allow the trial judge broader
power in ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence prior to submitting
the case to the jury than after rendition of the verdict. This is par-
ticularly evident in the area of verdict modification: prior to submis-
sion to the jury the court may direct the verdict or limit the scope of
the jury's determination through instructions, but after verdict the
only power of the trial judge on a finding of legal insufficiency of the
evidence is to grant a new trial.,, It is submitted that the power of
the trial judge to modify the verdict on a finding of insufficiency of
evidence should logically follow from his pre-submission control over
26. United States v. Linnier, 125 Fed. 83 (C.C.D. Neb. 1903) ; Simpson v. State,
56 Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99 (1892); People v. Sugarman, 80 Cal. App. 321, 251 Pac. 949
(1926); State v. Keasling, 74 Iowa 528, 38 N.W. 397 (1888); Commonwealth v.
Clifford, 254 Mass. 390, 150 N.E. 181 (1926) (the jury returned a verdict for a
greater crime than charged); Commonwealth v. Mahar, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 469
(1857) (trial court modified on hearing of a motion for arrest of judgment).
Cf. State v. Schele, 52 Iowa 608, 3 N.W. 632 (1879).
27. See text supported by notes 3-10 supra.
28. People v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 165, 259 Pac. 943 (1927) (excess of
jurisdiction); State v. Symes, 17 Wash. 596, 50 Pac. 487 (1897) (exceeded juris-
diction) ; State v. Odom, 292 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1956) (excess of authority, court
also held that the state had a right for the jury to determine the sentence);
State v. Howard, 19 Kan. 507 (1878) (lower court had modified to a crime not
included in the indictment, but court dictum to the effect that the trial court had
no power to modify for insufficiency of evidence).
29. See ORFIELD, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 510-13.
30. Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Super. 68, 24 A.2d 460 (1942) (prior to
statutory change, see note 14 supra) ; State v. Ferguson, 165 Tenn. 61, 52 S.W.2d
140 (1932). See also State v. Pottinger, 287 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1956).
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the verdict. Such an extension of power would eliminate many costly
new trials, lengthy appeals, and other injustices to the state and the
defendant.3 1 Thus, it is submitted that, rather than follow the proce-
dure of the principal case, adoption by the courts and/or legislatures
of any procedure which would obtain these advantages would be a step
forward in the administration of criminal justice.
JURISDICTION-FEDERAL STATE CONFLICT-RIGHT TO EXHAUST
PRIOR JURISDICTION
Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1956)
Petitioner was arrested while he was on probation from a federal
district court and was being held for prosecution by state authorities.
He petitioned the district court from which he was on probation for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that since he was a federal probationer
the state had no authority to proceed against him. The writ was issued
and petitioner released. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that
the issuance of the writ by the district court constituted an objection
to state invasion of federal jurisdiction.1
It is well established that in criminal prosecutions a court has juris-
diction over the accused when he is before the court regardless of how
his presence was secured.2 Equally well established is the principle
that in granting bail, parole, or probation, a sovereignty does not lose
legal custody of the person.3 Thus, a conflict may arise, as in the
principal case, where a court of one sovereignty acquires physical
custody of an individual while he is in legal custody of another sover-
eignty. It is generally stated that such a conflict between sovereignties
is to be resolved by an application of the rule of comity' which pro-
-vides that the sovereignty first acquiring jurisdiction (S-1) over a
person has the right to exhaust its jurisdiction before a second sover-
eignty (S-2) may proceed against that person. In the leading case of
31. For such a suggestion, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11 and comment (Draft
No. 2, 1954) (limiting reduction to cases of an unduly harsh character).
1. Strand v. Schmittroth, 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1956), 'ehearing denied, 235
F.2d 756, denial of rehearing vacated, Letter from Laughlin E. Waters to Harold
L. Satz, October 9, 1956.
2. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700
(1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
3. Taylor v. Taintor 83 U S. (16 Wall.) 366, 373 (1872) (bail); United States
ex rel. Lombardo v. Mcbonnell, 153 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1946) (parole); Grant
v. Guernsey, 63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933) (probation).
4. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); United States v. Marrin, 227 Fed.
314, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
5. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922); Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 366, 370 (1872). The doctrine has been extended to jurisdiction over prop-
erty. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 180 (1884). This rinciple applies whether
the S-1 sovereign is a state or the federal government. 0ovell v. Heyman, supra;
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